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Abstract. In this short paper, I present a few theorems on sentences of arithmetic which are
related to Yablo’s Paradox1 as Go¨del’s first undecidable sentence was related to the Liar paradox.2 In
particular, I consider two different arithemetizations of Yablo’s sentences: one resembling Go¨del’s
arithmetization of the Liar, with the negation outside of the provability predicate, one resembling
Jeroslow’s undecidable sentence,3 with negation inside. Both kinds of arithmetized Yablo sentence
are undecidable, and connected to the consistency sentence for the ambient formal system in roughly
the same manner as Go¨del and Jeroslow’s sentences.
Finally, I consider a sentence which is related to the Henkin sentence “I am provable” in the
same way that first two arithmetizations are related to Go¨del and Jeroslow’s sentences. I show that
this sentence is provable, using Lo¨b’s theorem, as in the standard proof of the Henkin sentence.
Below, I present a few theorems on sentences of arithmetic which are related to Yablo’s Paradox
approximately as Go¨del’s first undecidable sentence was related to the Liar paradox. Each one
involves taking a sentence—Go¨del’s, Jeroslow’s, or Henkin’s, as the superscripts suggest—which is
normally thought of as self-referential, and “unfurling” it into a sequence of sentences which would
naturally be thought of as constituting a non-well-founded chain of reference.
These results are of interest, first, because they tend to support Go¨del’s assertion that any “epis-
temological antinomy” can be used as a guide in finding some form of mathematical incompleteness,4
and second, because they present a striking link between the behavior of the arithmetical sentences
mentioned above (Go¨del’s, Henkin’s, and Jeroslow’s) and the behavior of their respective unfurled
counterparts considered below. In the absence of a counterexample, the correspondence suggests
that the pattern may extend to other cases, or may even be itself a candidate for investigation,
should a reasonable formalization of the notion of unfurling become available.
1. preliminaries
The technology employed by the proofs below is almost entirely standard. We do require free-
variable versions of the diagonal lemma, and of Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions. The gen-
eralized derivability conditions (GD1),(GD2), (GD3) may be somewhat unfamiliar. The last two
can be found in [Fef60], and the first is easy to prove in any reasonable system. We let M denote
any r.e. system of reasonable power (if you like, PA).
Definition 1. We let  abbreviate a predicate satisfying
(GD1) M ` φ(x) ⇒ M ` (pφ(x˙)q)
(GD2) M ` (x→y) → ((x) → (y))
(GD3) ψ(y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Σ1 ⇒ M ` ψ(y1, . . . , yk) → (pψ(y˙1, . . . , y˙k)q)
Remark 2 (Generalized Lo¨b’s Theorem). It follows from (GD1)-(GD3) that M ` (pφ(x˙)q) →
φ(x) implies M ` φ(x).
1Go¨del makes this connection in his published presentation of his result—[Go¨d86, p149].
2See [Yab93] for a canonical presentation
3presented in [Jer73]
4[Go¨d86, n14]
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Definition 3. With k a free variable, let
M ` Y J(k) ↔ (∀x > k)[(p¬Y (x˙)q)]
M ` Y G(k) ↔ (∀x > k)[¬(pY (x˙)q)]
M ` Y H(k) ↔ (∀x > k)[(pY (x˙)q)]
Remark 4. Inspecting the definitions, we see that if x > y, then M ` Y J/G/H(y¯) → Y J/G/H(x¯).
2. Theorems
Theorem 5.
(1) For any k
(a) If 1-Con(M), then M 0 Y J(k¯).
(b) If Con(M), then M 0 ¬Y J(k¯)
(2) For any k
(a) If Con(M), then M 0 Y G(k¯)
(b) If 1-Con(M), then M 0 ¬Y G(k¯)
(3) M ` Y H(k)
Proof. For (1), first suppose that M ` Y J(k¯). Then, evidently, M ` (p¬Y J( ˙¯k + 1)q), so by 1-
Con(M), M ` ¬Y J(k¯+1), which contradicts Y J(k¯), by Remark 4. Now, suppose that M ` ¬Y J(k¯).
This implies M ` (∃x > k¯)[¬(p¬Y (x˙)q)], which violates the second incompleteness theorem.
For (2), first suppose that M ` Y G(k¯). Then, evidently M ` ¬(pY ( ˙¯k + 1)q), But, also M `
Y G(k¯ + 1), by Remark 4, and so M ` (pY G( ˙¯k + 1)q), which violates the consistency of M. On
the other hand, suppose M ` ¬Y G(k¯). Then M ` (∃x > k)[(pY G(x˙)q)]. By 1-consistency,
and Σ1-completeness we get that, for some x, M ` (pY G( ˙¯x)q), and by a second application of
1-consistency, we get that M ` Y G(x¯), which is impossible, by the first part of the argument.
For (3), we aim to show that M ` (pY H(k˙)q) → Y H(k), and appeal to the generalized Lo¨b’s
theorem of Remark 2. So, assume, in M, that (pY H(k˙)q), so that by (GD1),(GD2),
(γ) (p(∀x > k˙)[(pY H(x˙)q)]q).
In M, fix an arbitrary x > k. By (GD3), and since “x > k” is a Σ1 formula, we have (px˙ >
k˙q). Thus, by (γ) and (GD1),(GD2), we have (p(∀z > x˙)[(pY H(z˙)q)]q). So equivalently, by
(GD1), (GD2), (pY H(x˙)q)). Since x > k was arbitrary, we have (∀x > k)[(pY H(x˙)q)], which
implies Y H(k), Discharging our assumption, we have M ` (pY H(k˙)q) → Y H(k), whence, by the
generalized Lo¨b Theorem 2, M ` Y H(k). 
Theorem 6. Let k be a free variable. Then
M ` Con(M) ↔ Y G(k)
Proof. The right-to-left implication is clear. For left-to-right, formalize the argument of (2) above:
That is, in M, let x > k be arbitrary. Then, aiming at a refutation of Con(M), assume in
M that (pY G(x˙)q). We then have, by (GD1), (GD2), that (p¬(pY G( ˙˙x + 1)q)q), but also
(pY G(x˙ + 1)q), from which, by (GD3), we have (p(pY G(x˙ + 1)q)q). These two together
imply ¬Con(M). So, discharging our assumption and contraposing, Con(M) → ¬(pY G(x˙)q). As
x > k was arbitrary, we have (∀x > k)[Con(M) → ¬(pY G(x˙)q)], so by standard manipulation of
quantifiers, Con(M) → (∀x > k)[¬(pY G(x˙)q)]. So, Con(M) → Y G(k). 
Theorem 7. Let k be a free variable. Then,
M ` Con(M) ↔ ¬Y J(k)
2
Proof. The right-to-left implication is clear. For left-to-right, let x > k be arbitrary in M, and
assume in M that (p¬Y J(x˙)q). Then, by (GD1), (GD2), (p(∃y > x˙)[¬(p¬Y (y˙)q)]q), whence
Con(M). By a formalized version of Go¨del’s second theorem, (pCon(M)q) → ¬Con(M), so
¬Con(M) follows. Thus, discharging our assumption and contraposing, Con(M) → ¬(pY J(x˙)q).
Since x > k was arbitrary, evidently, Con(M) → (∀x > k)[¬(p¬Y J(x˙)q)], so very directly,
Con(M) → (∃x > k)[¬(p¬Y J(x˙)q)], whence Con(M) → ¬Y J(k). 
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